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Abstract
Brown at 50: This essay will appear in the Virginia Law Review’s symposium
issue commemorating the 50th anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education. It
canvasses three issues: (1) why was Brown a hard case for the justices?; (2) how
were the justices able to overcome their legal doubts about invalidating school
segregation to achieve a unanimous decision invalidating that practice?; (3) what
were the consequences of Brown? (and, more speciﬁcally, how did Brown rad-
icalize political opinion in the South, thus creating a climate ripe for violence,
and how did the brutalization of peaceful black protestors by white law enforce-
ment ofﬁcers, when broadcast on national television, transform national opinion





Brown v. Board of Education
1 is probably the most famous decision in the history of the 
United States Supreme Court.  As we celebrate Brown’s fiftieth anniversary, it is worth 
pondering why the justices found the case so difficult and what its implications were for the 
modern civil rights movement.
Most people today would be surprised to learn that Brown was a hard case for the 
justices.  If state-mandated segregation of public schools is not unconstitutional, what is?  The 
fact that the ruling in Brown was unanimous, moreover, suggests that the case was an easy one.  
Yet appearances can be deceptive.  In fact, the justices were at first deeply divided how to 
resolve Brown.  Indeed, several of them were never fully convinced that they had found a sound 
legal basis for declaring segregation unconstitutional.
2
In a memorandum to the files that he dictated the day Brown was decided, Justice 
William O. Douglas observed, 
In the original conference [in December 1952], there were only four who voted that 
segregation in the public schools was unconstitutional. Those four were Black, Burton, 
Minton and myself. Vinson was of the opinion that the Plessy case was right and that 
segregation was constitutional.  Reed followed the view of Vinson, and Clark was 
1 James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law and Professor of History, University of 
Virginia. 
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 For a more complete discussion of the justices’ internal deliberations in Brown, see 
Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for 
Racial Equality 292-312 (2004).
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inclined that way.
4
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, according to Douglas, “viewed the problem with great alarm 
and thought that the Court should not decide the question if it was possible to avoid it.”  
Ultimately, however, both believed that “segregation in the public schools was probably 
constitutional.”  
In Douglas’s estimation, in 1952 “the vote would [have been] five to four in favor of the 
constitutionality of segregation in the public schools.”  Other justices who were counting heads 
reached roughly similar conclusions.  In a letter written to Justice Reed just days after Brown
was decided, Felix Frankfurter noted that he had “no doubt” that a vote taken in December 1952 
would have invalidated segregation by five to four.
5  The dissenters would have been Vinson, 
Reed, Jackson, and Clark, and the majority would have written “several opinions.” 
Brown was hard for many of the justices because it posed a conflict between their legal 
views and their personal values.  The sources of constitutional interpretation to which they 
ordinarily looked for guidance–text, original understanding, precedent, and custom–indicated 
that school segregation was permissible.  By contrast, most of the justices privately condemned 
segregation, which Justice Black called “Hitler’s creed.”
6  Their quandary was how to reconcile 
their legal and moral views.
Frankfurter’s preferred approach to adjudication required that he separate his personal 
views from the law.  He preached that judges must decide cases based upon “the compulsions of 
4 Douglas, memorandum for the file, Segregation Cases, 17 May 1954, Box 1149, 
Douglas Papers, Library of Congress.
5 Frankfurter to Reed, 20 May 1954, Reed Papers, University of Kentucky.
6 Del Dickson, ed., The Supreme Court in Conference (1940-1985): The Private 
Discussions Behind Nearly 300 Supreme Court Decisions 639 (2001) (reproducing discussion in 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, Apr. 8, 1950).
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governing legal principles,”
7 not “the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment.”
8   In a 
memorandum he wrote in 1940, Frankfurter noted that “[n]o duty of judges is more important 
nor more difficult to discharge than that of guarding against reading their personal and debatable 
opinions into the case.”
9
Yet Frankfurter abhorred racial segregation, and his personal behavior clearly 
demonstrated his egalitarian commitments.  In the 1930s he had served on the National Legal 
Committee of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and 
in 1948 he had hired the Court’s first black law clerk, William Coleman.
10  Nonetheless, he 
insisted that his personal views were of limited relevance to the legal question of whether 
segregation was constitutional: “However passionately any of us may hold egalitarian views, 
however fiercely any of us may believe that such a policy of segregation . . . is both unjust and 
shortsighted[, h]e travels outside his judicial authority if for this private reason alone he declares 
[it] unconstitutional.”
11  The Court could invalidate the practice, Frankfurter believed, only if it 
was legally as well as morally objectionable. 
Yet Frankfurter had difficulty finding a compelling legal argument for striking down 
segregation.  His law clerk, Alexander Bickel, spent a summer reading the legislative history of 
7 Quoted in Melvin I. Urofsky, Division and Discord: The Supreme Court Under Stone 
and Vinson, 1941-1953, at 130 (1997).
8 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
9 Urofsky, supra note __, at 109 n.112.  This memo was written in conjunction with the 
first flag-salute case, 
10 Melvin I. Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter: Judicial Restraint and Individual Liberties 128-29 
(1991): Urofsky, supra note __, at 260.
11 Frankfurter, memorandum (first draft), undated, 1, Frankfurter Papers, microfilm 
edition, part 2, reel 4, frame 378 (University Publications of America 1986).
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the Fourteenth Amendment, and he reported to Frankfurter that “it is impossible to conclude that 
the 39th Congress intended that segregation be abolished; impossible also to conclude that they 
foresaw it might be, under the language they were adopting.”
12  To be sure, Frankfurter believed 
that the meaning of constitutional concepts can change over time,
13 but as he and his colleagues 
deliberated, public schools in twenty-one states and the District of Columbia were still 
segregated.  He could thus hardly maintain that evolving social standards condemned the 
practice.  Furthermore, judicial precedent, which Frankfurter called “the most influential factor 
in giving a society coherence and continuity,”
14 strongly supported it.  Of forty-four challenges 
to school segregation adjudicated by state appellate and lower federal courts between 1865 and 
1935, not one had succeeded.
15  Indeed, on the basis of legislative history and precedent, 
Frankfurter had to concede that “Plessy is right.”
16
Brown presented a similar dilemma for Robert H. Jackson, who also found segregation 
anathema.  In a 1950 letter, Jackson, who had left the Court during the 1945-1946 term to 
prosecute Nazis at Nuremberg, wrote to a friend: “You and I have seen the terrible consequences 
of racial hatred in Germany.  We can have no sympathy with racial conceits which underlie 
12 Alexander M. Bickel to Frankfurter, 22 Aug. 1953, Frankfurter Papers, part 2, reel 4, 
frames 212-14.
13 Urofsky (Supreme Court Under Stone and Vinson), supra note __, at 217-18, 222.
14 Mary Frances Berry, Stability, Security, and Continuity: Mr. Justice Burton and 
Decision Making in the Supreme Court 1945-1958, at 142 (1978).
15 Note, Constitutionality of Educational Segregation, 17 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 208, 214 n. 
20 (1949).
16 Douglas conference notes, Briggs v. Elliott, 12 Dec. 1953, case file: Segregation Cases, 
Box 1149, Douglas Papers.
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segregation policies.”
17  Yet, like Frankfurter, Jackson thought that judges were obliged to 
separate their personal views from the law, and he was loathe to overrule precedent.
Jackson revealed his internal struggles in a draft concurring opinion that began: 
“Decision of these cases would be simple if our personal opinion that school segregation is 
morally, economically or politically indefensible made it legally so.”
18  But because Jackson 
believed that judges must subordinate their personal preferences to the law, this consideration 
was irrelevant.  When he turned to the question of whether “existing law condemn[s] 
segregation,” he had difficulty answering in the affirmative:
Layman as well as lawyer must query how it is that the Constitution this morning forbids 
what for three-quarters of a century it has tolerated or approved.  He must further 
speculate as to how [we can justify] this reversal of its meaning by the branch of the 
Government supposed not to make new law but only to declare existing law and which 
has exactly the same constitutional materials that so far as the states are concerned have 
existed since 1868 and in the case of the District of Columbia since 1791 . . . . 
Convenient as it would be to reach an opposite conclusion, I simply cannot find in the 
conventional material of constitutional interpretation any justification for saying that in 
maintaining segregated schools any state or the District of Columbia can be judicially 
decreed, up to the date of this decision, to have violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
19
Jackson hesitated to invalidate segregation for another reason as well.  He had become 
skeptical of judicial supremacy, not only because he thought it was inconsistent with democracy, 
but also because he feared that it was a practical impossibility.  Jackson worried that 
17 Jackson to Charles Fairman, 13 March 1950, Fairman file, Box 12, Jackson Papers. 
18 Jackson draft concurrence, School Segregation Cases, 15 March 1954, p.1, case file: 
segregation cases, Box 184, Jackson Papers.
19 Id. at 5, 10.
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unenforceable judicial decrees bred public cynicism about courts.  In a posthumously published 
book, he wrote: “When the Court has gone too far, it has provoked reactions which have set back 
the cause it was designed to advance, and has sometimes called down upon itself severe 
rebuke.”
20  As the justices deliberated in Brown, Jackson wondered if the Court was up to the 
task of transforming southern race relations.  Litigants would quickly discover “that devices of 
delay are numerous and often successful.”
21  Enforcement would require coercing “not merely 
individuals but the public itself.”  Because a ruling against one school district would not bind any 
other, every instance of recalcitrance would necessitate separate litigation.  Individual blacks 
would bear this burden; the Justice Department was unlikely to sue, and even if it wished to, 
Congress probably would not appropriate the necessary funds. 
That the nine justices who initially considered Brown would be uneasy about invalidating 
segregation is unsurprising.  All of them had been appointed by Presidents Roosevelt and 
Truman on the assumption that they supported, as Jackson put it, “the doctrine on which the 
Roosevelt fight against the old court was based–in part, that it had expanded the Fourteenth 
Amendment to take an unjustified judicial control over social and economic affairs.”
22  For most 
of their professional lives, these men had criticized untethered judicial activism as 
undemocratic–the invalidation of the popular will by unelected officeholders who were 
inscribing their social and economic biases onto the Constitution.  This is how all nine of them 
20 Robert H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government 80 
(1955). 
21 Jackson draft concurrence, School Segregation Cases, 7 Dec. 1953, pp. 8-10, case file: 
segregation cases, Box 184, Jackson Papers.  See also Gregory S. Chernack, The Clash of Two 
Worlds: Justice Robert H. Jackson, Institutional Pragmatism, and Brown, 72 Temple L. Rev. 51, 
53-54, 59-63, 73-75, 88-89 (1999).
22 Jackson to Fairman, supra note __. 
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understood the Lochner
23 era, the period between 1905 and 1937, when the Court had invalidated 
protective labor legislation on a thin constitutional basis.  The question in Brown, as Jackson’s 
law clerk William H. Rehnquist noted, was whether invalidating school segregation would 
eliminate any distinction between this Court and its predecessor, except for “the kinds of litigants
it favors and the kinds of special claims it protects.”
24
Thus, several justices wondered whether the Court was the right institution to forbid 
segregation.  Several expressed views similar to Vinson’s: If segregation was to be condemned, 
“it would be better if [Congress] would act.”
25  Jackson cautioned that 
[h]owever desirable it may be to abolish educational segregation, we cannot, with a 
proper sense of responsibility, ignore the question whether the use of judicial office to 
initiate law reforms that cannot get enough national public support to put them through 
Congress, is our own constitutional function.  Certainly, policy decisions by the least 
democratic and the least representative of our branches of government are hard to 
justify.
26
“[I]f we have to decide the question,” he lamented, “then representative government has 
failed.”
27
* * * * *
23 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
24 WHR (William H. Rehnquist), “A Random Thought on the Segregation Cases,” Box 
184, Jackson Papers. 
25 Burton conference notes, Segregation Cases, 13 Dec. 1952, Box 244, Burton Papers, 
Library of Congress.
26 Jackson to Fairman, supra note __. 
27 Douglas conference notes, Briggs v. Elliott, 12 Dec. 1953, case file: Segregation Cases, 
Box 1149, Douglas Papers. 
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In the end, even the most conflicted justices voted to invalidate segregation.  How were 
they able to overcome their ambivalence?  All judicial decision making involves extralegal, or 
“political” considerations, such as the judges’ personal values, social mores, and external 
political pressure.
28  But when the law–as reflected in text, original understanding, precedent, 
and custom–is clear, judges will generally follow it.  In 1954 the law–as understood by most of 
the justices–was reasonably clear: Segregation was constitutional.  For the justices to reject a 
result so clearly indicated by the conventional legal sources suggests that they had very strong 
personal preferences to the contrary.  
And so they did.  Although the Court had unanimously and casually endorsed public 
school segregation as recently as 1927,
29 by the early 1950s, the views of most of the justices 
reflected the dramatic popular changes in racial attitudes and practices that had resulted from 
World War II.
30  The ideology of the war was antifascist and prodemocratic, and the contribution 
of African-American soldiers was undeniable.  Upon their return to the South, thousands of black 
veterans tried to vote, many expressing the view of one such veteran that “after having been 
overseas fighting for democracy, I thought that when we got back here we should enjoy a little of 
it.”
31  Thousands more joined the NAACP, and many became civil rights litigants.  Others helped 
launch a postwar social movement for racial justice.  
Two other developments in the 1940s also fueled African-American progress.  Over the 
28 For elaboration of this view of how judges decide cases, see Klarman, supra note __, at 
4-6, 446-54.
29 Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
30 This and the following three paragraphs are based on Klarman, supra note __, at 173-
93 (citing relevant literature).
31 Quoted in Robert J. Norrell, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Civil Rights Movement in 
Tuskegee 60-61 (1985).
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course of the decade, more than one and a half million southern blacks, pushed by changes in 
southern agriculture and pulled by wartime industrial demand, migrated to northern cities.  This 
mass relocation–from a region in which blacks were nearly universally disfranchised to one in 
which they could vote nearly without restriction–greatly enhanced their political power; indeed, 
they became a key swing constituency in the North.  Other blacks migrated from farms to cities 
within the South, facilitating the creation of a black middle class that had the inclination, 
capacity, and opportunity to engage in coordinate social protest.  
 The onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s created another impetus for racial reform.  In 
the ideological contest with communism, American democracy was on trial, and southern white 
supremacy was its greatest vulnerability.  As the Justice Department’s brief in Brown argued, 
“Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills.”
32  After Brown, 
supporters of the decision boasted that America’s leadership of the free world “now rests on a 
firmer basis”
33 and that American democracy had been “vindicat[ed] . . . in the eyes of the 
world.”
34
By the early 1950s such forces had produced concrete racial reforms.  In 1947, Jackie 
Robinson desegregated major league baseball.  In 1948, Harry S  Truman issued executive orders 
desegregating the federal military and civil service.  Dramatic changes in racial practices were 
occurring even in the South.  Black voter registration there increased from 3 percent in 1940 to 
32 Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae, Brown v. Board of Education, 6, in Philip 
B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds., 49 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court 
of the United States 121 (year??).
33 Quoted in Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the 
Supreme Court, 1936-1961, at 172-73 (1994).
34 Chicago Defender, 22 May 1954, p.5.
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20 percent in 1950.
35  In the most regressive states, Mississippi and Alabama, black voter 
registration increased tenfold in the decade following World War II, and in Louisiana it 
increased more than twentyfold.  Dozens of urban police forces in the South, including some in 
Mississippi, hired their first black officers.  Minor league baseball teams, even in such places as 
Montgomery and Birmingham, Alabama, signed their first black players.  Most southern states, 
including Louisiana, peacefully desegregated their graduate and professional schools under court 
order.  Blacks began serving again on southern juries.  In Louisiana and in most states outside of 
the Deep South, the first blacks since Reconstruction were elected to urban political offices, and 
the walls of segregation were occasionally breached in public facilities and accommodations.
As they deliberated over Brown, the justices expressed astonishment at the extent of the 
recent changes.  Minton detected “a different world today” with regard to race.
36  Frankfurter 
noted “the great changes in the relations between white and colored people since the first World 
War” and remarked that “the pace of progress has surprised even those most eager in its 
promotion.”
37  Jackson may have gone furthest, citing black advancement as a constitutional 
justification for eliminating segregation.  In his draft opinion he wrote that segregation “has 
outlived whatever justification it may have had . . . . Negro progress under segregation has been 
spectacular and, tested by the pace of history, his rise is one of the swiftest and most dramatic 
advances in the annals of man.”
38  Blacks had thus “overcome the presumptions” on which the 
35 David J. Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, at 7 tbl. 1-1, 11 tbl. 1-2 (1978).
36 Burton conference notes, School Segregation Cases, 12 Dec. 1953, Box 244, Burton 
Papers.
37 Frankfurter memorandum, undated, p.2, Frankfurter papers, microfilm edition, part 2, 
reel 4, frame 379.
38 Jackson draft concurrence, supra note __, at 1, 19-21.
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system was based” and race “no longer affords a reasonable basis” for educational 
classifications.   It was these sorts of changes that made Brown possible.  Frankfurter later 
conceded that he would have voted to uphold public school segregation in the 1940s because 
“public opinion had not then crystallized against it.”
39  The justices in Brown did not think that 
they were creating a movement for racial reform; they understood that they were working with, 
not against, historical forces.
* * * * *  
If Brown did not create the civil rights movement that swept the nation in the 1950s and 
1960s, what were its contributions to that movement?
40  There were several.  Brown dramatically 
increased the salience of the segregation issue, forcing many people to take a position for the 
first time.  The decision was also hugely symbolic to African Americans, many of whom 
regarded it as the greatest victory for their race since the Emancipation Proclamation.  One black 
leader called Brown “a majestic break in the dark clouds,”
41 and another later recalled that blacks 
“literally got out and danced in the streets.”
42 Brown also inspired southern blacks to file 
petitions and lawsuits challenging school segregation, even in areas of the Deep South, where 
such bold tactics would otherwise have been inconceivable.
But Brown may have mattered most in a way that has not been sufficiently appreciated. 
39 Quoted in Douglas memorandum, 25 Jan. 1960, reproduced in Melvin I. Urofsky, ed., 
The Douglas Letters: Selections from the Private Papers of Justice William O. Douglas 169 
(1987).
40 The connection between Brown and the civil rights movement is explored in greater 
detail in Klarman, supra note __, at 363-442.
41 Chicago Defender, 22 May 1954, p.5.
42 Quoted in Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black 
Communities Organizing for Change 81 (1984).
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By the early 1960s, a powerful direct-action protest movement–sit-ins, freedom rides, and street 
demonstrations–had exploded in the South.  While Brown’s role in sparking such activity has 
been much debated, several things are clear.  When law enforcement officers responded to these 
demonstrations with restraint, media attention quickly waned and the protests failed to achieve 
their objectives.  That is how Sheriff Laurie Pritchett minimized the effect of mass 
demonstrations in Albany, Georgia, in 1961-1962; Mississippi officials defused the Freedom 
Rides in a similar manner in the summer of 1961.  However, when southern sheriffs used 
beatings, police dogs, and fire hoses to suppress protestors, media attention escalated, and 
northerners reacted with horror and outrage.  Brutal assaults on peaceful demonstrators by 
southern law enforcement officers transformed northern opinion and enabled the passage of 
landmark civil rights legislation.
Brown contributed to this violence by ensuring that when direct action protests came to 
the South, politicians such as Bull Connor and George Wallace were there to meet them.  It did 
so by inflaming racial tensions and reversing what had been steady black progress in the region.  
Before Brown, most white southerners thought the NAACP “at worst was a bunch of 
Republicans,”
43 but afterwards the organization “became an object of consuming hatred.”
44  With 
the threat of school desegregation lurking in the background, whites in the Deep South suddenly 
found black voting intolerable, and dramatic postwar expansions of black suffrage in Mississippi, 
Alabama, and Louisiana were halted and then reversed.  Brown likewise retarded university 
desegregation, which had been proceeding fairly smoothly after Sweatt v. Painter (1950),
45 and 
the nascent integration of minor league baseball and college athletics.  
In the wake of Brown, white southerners made clear–in both word and deed–that they 
43 Roy Wilkins to W. Lester Banks, 20 Aug. 1957, NAACP, part 20, reel 12, frame 982.
44 Benjamin Muse, Ten Years of Prelude: The Story of Integration since the Supreme 
Court’s 1954 Decision 39-40 (1964).
45 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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were willing to go to violent lengths to maintain white supremacy and resist desegregation.  
After years of quiescence, the Ku Klux Klan reappeared in such states as South Carolina, 
Florida, and Alabama; a Klan leader reported that Brown created “a situation loaded with 
dynamite” and “really gave us a push.”
46  Now that the justices had “abolished the Mason-Dixon 
line,” Klansmen vowed “to establish the Smith and Wesson line.”
47  Even citizens’ councils, 
organizations committed to preserving segregation while ostensibly eschewing the violent tactics 
of the Klan, took a militant stance.  A Mississippi council asserted that “there is a point beyond 
which even the most judicious restraint becomes cowardice.”
48  A Dallas minister told a large 
citizens’ council rally that if public officials would not block integration, plenty of people were 
prepared “to shed blood if necessary to stop this work of Satan.”
49  A handbill circulated at a 
similar rally in Montgomery declared that “[w]hen in the course of human events it becomes 
necessary to abolish the Negro race, proper methods should be used,” including guns and 
knives.
50
Three murders in Mississippi in 1955 showed that the vitriolic response to Brown was not 
46 N. K. Perlow, “KKK Leader Warns: ‘We Mean Business,’” Police Gazette, Aug. 1956, 
7, NAACP Papers, part 20, reel 13, frame 444.
47 Stan Opotowsky, “Dixie Dynamite: The Inside Story of the White Citizens’ Councils” 
(reprinted from New York Post, 6-20 Jan. 1957), p.15, NAACP Papers, part 20, reel 13, frame 
682.
48 Southern School News , Feb. 1963, p.17.
49 Southern School News , Aug. 1957, p.7.
50 Handbill circulated at Montgomery citizens’ council meeting, 10 Feb. 1957, NAACP 
Papers, part 20, reel 5, frame 126.
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merely rhetorical.
51 Although Mississippi blacks exercising their right to vote in the late 1940s 
had risked harassment and beatings, the stakes were raised when two blacks were killed for 
voting-related activity in 1955.  And although the number of reported lynchings in Mississippi 
had dropped to zero in the years before Brown, fourteen-year-old Emmet Till was also murdered 
in Mississippi that year for allegedly whistling at a white woman.  One white Mississippian 
declared that “[t]here’s open season on the Negroes now.  They’ve got no protection, and any 
peckerwood who wants can go out and shoot himself one].”
52  The NAACP published a 
pamphlet that year entitled, “M is for Mississippi and Murder.”
53
Till’s funeral in Chicago attracted thousands of mourners, and a photograph of his 
mutilated body in the magazine Jet seared the conscience of northerners.  Segregating black 
school children was one thing, lynching them quite another.  And to some observers, at least, the 
cause of the tragic events was clear.  As the Yazoo City (Mississippi) Herald declared, Till’s 
blood was on the hands of the Supreme Court justices who had decided Brown.
54  Yet the Herald
might more accurately have blamed Till’s muder and the South’s stunning retrogression on 
southern politicians, whose response to Brown involved a resort to extremism and highly 
inflammatory language.  In the mid-1950s, political contests in southern states assumed a 
51 For this paragraph generally, see John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil 
Rights in Mississippi 53-58 (1994); James C. Cobb, The Most Southern Place on Earth: The 
Mississippi Delta and the Roots of Regional Identity 214-22 (1992); Charles M. Payne, I’ve Got 
the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle 36-40 
(1995); Stephen J. Whitfield, A Death in the Delta: The Story of Emmett Till 15-42 (1988).
52 Quoted in Dittmer, supra note __, at 53-58 (check precise page).




common pattern:  Candidates sought to show that they were the most “blatantly and 
uncompromisingly prepared to cling to segregation at all costs.”
55  As “moderation” became a 
term of derision, the political center collapsed, leaving only “those who want to maintain the 
Southern way of life or those who want to mix the races.”
56  Moderate critics of massive 




“traitors,” and “burglars . . . [who] want to rob us of our priceless heritage.”  Previously 
moderate lawmakers either joined the segregationist bandwagon or were unceremoniously retired 
from service. 
Most southern politicians prudently avoided explicit exhortations to violence, and many 
affirmatively discouraged it.  Still, their extremist rhetoric sounded very like a call to arms and 
probably encouraged the use of force.  Governor Marvin Griffin of Georgia condemned violence 
but insisted that “no true Southerner feels morally obliged to recognize the legality” of Brown, 
which he called an “act of tryanny,” and proclaimed that the South “stands ready to battle side-
by-side for its sacred rights, . . . but not with guns.”
60  Congressman James Davis of Georgia 
55 Muse, supra note __, at 168.
56 Montgomery Advertiser, 12 May, 1957, quoted in Weldon James, “The South’s Own 
Civil War: Battle for the Schools,” in Don Shoemaker, ed., With All Deliberate Speed: 
Segregation-Desegregation in Southern Schools 15, 23 (1957).
57 Southern School News , Nov. 1954, p.15 (quoting Representative Tuck of Virginia).
58 Southern School News , July 1956, p.3 (quoting Governor Marvin Griffin of Georgia).
59 This and the following two quotes are from Southern School News, Oct. 1959, p.3 
(quoting Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippi). 
60 Southern School News , Nov. 1954, p.10; June 1956, p.3. ( Please check to see if these 
two Griffin quotes come from two different stories or just one.)
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insisted that “[t]here is no place for violence or lawless acts”–but only after calling Brown “a 
monumental fraud which is shocking, outrageous and reprehensible,” warning against “meekly 
accept[ing] this brazen usurpation of power,” and denying any obligation “to bow the neck to 
this new form of tyranny.”
61  Such lip service was wholly beyond some southern politicians, 
such as the Alabama legislator who declared that whites must leave the state, “stay here and be 
humiliated, or take up our shotguns.”
62
In the end, whether such political demagoguery actually produced violence mattered less 
than the carefully cultivated perception that it did so.  The NAACP constantly asserted such a 
linkage–by, for example, blaming southern politicians for fostering a climate conducive to the 
lynching of a black man, Mack Parker, near Poplarville, Mississippi, in 1959.
63  James Meredith, 
the first black man to attend Ole Miss, attributed the assassination of the NAACP’s Mississippi 
field secretary, Medgar Evers, to “governors of the Southern states and their defiant and 
provocative actions.”
64  One Tennessee lawyer blamed violence related to school desegregation 
on congressmen who had signed the Southern Manifesto, which assailed Brown as a “clear abuse 
of judicial power” and pledged all “lawful means” of resistance
65: “What the hell do you expect 
61 Speech of Rep. James C. Davis of Georgia, 31 March 1956, in Extension of Remarks 
of Rep. John Bell Williams, Congressional Record, 23 Apr. 1956, NAACP Papers, part 20, reel 
13, frames 346, 347, 351.  Law Review: If you want to try to find this in the Congressional 
Record and then cite directly to that, I have no objection.  I’m also content to leave as is 
with reference to NAACP Papers.
62 Quoted in NAACP press release, 1 March 1956, part 20, reel 13, frame 168. 
63 Southern School News, June 1959, p.16.
64 Southern School News , Aug. 1963, p.20.
65 The Southern Manifesto is reproduced in Southern School News, Apr. 1956, pp. 1, ??
(Law Review, please fill in appropriate page). 
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these people to do when they have 90 some odd congressmen from the South signing a piece of 
paper that says you’re a southern hero if you defy the Supreme Court?”
66  After a temple was 
bombed in Atlanta in 1958, Mayor William Hartsfield declared that “[w]hether they like it or 
not, every rabble-rousing politician is the godfather of the cross-burners and the dynamiters who 
are giving the South a bad name.”
67
The link between extremist politicians and violence is certainly plausible, but the causal 
connection between particular public officials and the brutality that inspired civil rights 
legislation is downright compelling.  Two of the most prominent examples are T. Eugene 
(“Bull”) Connor, the police commissioner of Birmingham, and George Wallace, the governor of 
Alabama.  The violence they at best condoned and at worst actively fomented proved critical to 
transforming national opinion on race and the segregation issue.
Connor had first been elected to the Birmingham City Commission in 1937, when he 
pledged to crush the communist/integrationist threat posed by the unionization efforts of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations.
68  By 1950, however, civic leaders had come to regard 
Connor a liability because of his extremism and frequently brutal treatment of blacks, and they 
orchestrated his public humiliation through an illicit sexual encounter.  Connor retired from 
politics in 1953, and signs of a racial detente in Birmingham–including the establishment of the 
first hospital for blacks, the desegregation of elevators in downtown office buildings, and serious 
efforts to integrate the police force–quickly followed. 
66 Quoted in J.W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School 
Desegregation 138 (1961).
67 Quoted in Robert E. Bundy to Executives of Voluntary Affiliate Organizations, 
Circular re: Recent Bombing Incidents, 20 Oct. 1958, part 20, reel 6, frame 723.
68 For this paragraph, see Glenn T. Eskew, But for Birmingham: The Local and National 
Movements in the Civil Rights Struggle 91-92, 104-05 (1997): William A. Nunnelley, Bull 
Connor 4, 30, 34, 36-37, 40-44, 67 (1991).
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After Brown, however, the city’s racial progress ground to a halt.
69  An interracial 
committee disbanded in 1956, consultation between the races ceased, and Connor resurrected his 
political career.  In 1957 he regained his city commission seat, defeating an incumbent he 
attacked as weak on segregation.  In the late 1950s, the Klan perpetrated a wave of bombings and 
brutality, and the police, under Connor’s control, declined to interfere.  Standing for reelection in 
1961, Connor offered the KKK fifteen minutes of “open season” on the Freedom Riders, as they 
rolled into town.  After horrific beatings had been administered to media representatives as well 
as demonstrators, the Birmingham News wondered, “Where were the police?”
70  City voters, who 
had handed Connor a landslide victory just two weeks earlier, were probably less curious. 
In 1963 the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), after the failed 
demonstrations in Albany, Georgia, sought a city with a police chief unlikely to duplicate Laurie 
Pritchett’s restraint.
71  They selected Birmingham, in part because of Connor’s treatment of the 
Freedom Riders two years earlier.  Martin Luther King, Jr.’s lieutenant, Wyatt Walker, later 
69 For this paragraph, see Nunnelley, supra note __, at 4, 51-60, 67, 74-75, 78, 98-101, 
107-09; Andrew Michael Manis, A Fire You Can't Put Out: The Civil Rights Life of 
Birmingham's Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth 84, 86, 137, 161, 170-73, 265, 267 (1999); Eskew, 
supra note __, at 118, 153, 157, 160, 165-66, 175-76; J. Mills Thornton, “Municipal Politics and 
the Course of the Movement,” in Armstead L. Robinson & Patricia Sullivan, eds., New 
Directions in Civil Rights Studies  48 -49 (1991).
70  Quoted in Southern School News, June 1963, p.6.
71 For this paragraph and the following two, see David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: 
Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 227-28, 231-64 
(1988); David J. Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, at 138-41, 166-68 (1978); Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can’t Wait 65-66, 69, 79, 114 
(1964); Manis, supra note __, at 331-32, 345, 348-49, 365-66, 369-72; Eskew, supra note __, at 
3-7, 17, 217-99.
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explained: “We knew that when we came to Birmingham that if Bull Connor was still in control, 
he would do something to benefit our movement.”
72
The strategy worked brilliantly.  Connor eventually unleashed police dogs and fire hoses 
on the unresisting demonstrators, many of whom were children.  Television and newspapers 
featured images of breathtaking savagery, including one that President John F. Kennedy reported 
made him sick.  Editorials condemned the violence as a national disgrace.  Citizens voiced their 
“sense of unutterable outrage and shame”
73 and demanded that politicians take “action to 
immediately put to an end the barbarism and savagery in Birmingham.”
74  Within ten weeks, 
spinoff demonstrations had spread to more than one hundred cities.
Televised brutality against peaceful civil rights demonstrators in Birmingham 
dramatically altered northern opinion on race, and it led directly to the passage of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. Opinion polls revealed that the percentage of Americans who deemed civil rights the 
nation’s most urgent issue rose from 4 percent before Birmingham to 52 percent after.
75
Members of Congress denounced the Birmingham violence and, in the same breath,  introduced 
measures to end federal aid to segregated schools.  Kennedy overhauled his earlier civil rights 
proposals, taking a far stronger stand on black suffrage, desegregation, and racial discrimination 
in general.   Only after the police dogs and fire hoses of Birmingham did he announce on 
national television that civil rights was a “moral issue as old as the scriptures and as clear as the 
72 Quoted in Garrow (Bearing the Cross), supra note __, at 227-28.
73 Rose V. Russell to Pres. Kennedy, 8 May 1963, NAACP Papers, part 20, reel 4, frame 
307
74; Nubar Esaian to Pres. Kennedy, 8 May 1963, NAACP Papers, part 20, reel 4, frames 
313-15.
75 George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1937-1971, vol. 3, 1769 (1972).
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American Constitution.”
76
Like Bull Connor, Alabama’s governor, George Wallace, was also an unwitting agent of 
racial progress.  Perhaps more than any other individual, Wallace personified the effect of  Brown
on southern politics.  Early in his postwar political career, Wallace had been criticized as being 
“soft” on segregation.  In the mid-1950s, however, sensing the changing political winds, he 
broke with the racially moderate governor, James Folsom, and cultivated conflict with federal 
authorities over racial issues in his position as Barbour County circuit judge.
77
But he had not gone far enough.  In 1958, Wallace’s principal opponent in the Alabama 
governor’s race was Attorney General John Patterson, who bragged of shutting down NAACP 
operations in the state–and who received the Klan’s endorsement.  Wallace became the candidate 
of moderation in comparison, and Patterson won easily, leaving Wallace to ruminate that “they 
out-niggered me that time, but they will never do it again.”
78  He made good on that vow in 
1962, winning on a campaign promise of defying federal integration orders.  In his inaugural 
address, he declare, “In the name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the 
line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny and I say segregation now, 
segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.”
79
76 Quoted in Southern School News, July 1963, p.16. Law Review: if the full quotation 
doesn’t appear here, let me know and I’ll replace this with a secondary source.  
Alternatively, we could try to cite the New York Times on June 12, 1963, the day after 
Kennedy’s speech to the nation.
77 For this paragraph and the next, see Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George 
Wallace, The Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics 76, 
82, 84-87, 90-96 (1995): Marshall Frady, Wallace 97-98, 106-08, 116, 121-31 (1968).
78 Southern School News , June 1962, p.8.
79 Southern School News , Feb. 1963, pp. 10 -11.
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Like most southern politicians, Wallace publicly condemned violence.
80  Yet his actions 
from 1963 to 1965 encouraged the brutality that helped transform national opinion on race.  
During the Birmingham demonstrations, Wallace praised Connor’s forcefulness and dispatched 
several hundred state troopers who readily joined the fray.  In the summer of 1963, Wallace 
fulfilled a campaign pledge by temporarily blocking the entrance to the University of Alabama.
81
That September, Wallace used state troops to block the court-ordered desegregation of public 
schools in Birmingham, Mobile, and Tuskegee.  He also encouraged extremist groups to wage “a 
boisterous campaign” against desegregation, and he defended rioters, whom he insisted were 
“not thugs–they are good working people who get mad when they see something like this 
happen.” 
82
Threatened with contempt citations by all five Alabama district judges, Wallace 
eventually relented.  The schools desegregated, but within a week tragedy had struck.  
Birmingham Klansmen, possibly inspired by such gubernatorial proclamations as “I can’t fight 
federal bayonets with my bare hands,”
83 dynamited the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, killing 
four black schoolgirls.  Within hours of the bombing on September 15, 1963, two other black 
teenagers had been killed, one by white hoodlums and the other by police.  It was the largest 
death toll of the civil rights era, and Wallace’s role did not go unnoticed.  Martin Luther King, 
Jr., publicly blamed the Alabama governor for “creat[ing] the climate that made it possible for 
someone to plant that bomb.”
84  President Kennedy, noting “a deep sense of outrage and grief,” 
80 For this paragraph and the next, see Carter, supra note __, at 110-83.
81 Southern School News , June 1963, pp. 1, 5, 6.
82 Quoted in Carter, supra note __, at 174. Law Review: I believe both of these quotes 
are from Carter, but if you can’t find one of them there, let me know and I’ll find it.
83 Quoted in id.
84 Southern School News , Oct. 1963, p.1.   Law Review: The King quotation might be 
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thought it “regrettable that public disparagement of law and order has encouraged violence 
which has fallen on the innocent.”
85  Wallace may not have sought the violence, but his 
provocative rhetoric probably contributed to it, and he certainly took no measures to prevent it.
Most of the nation was appalled by the murder of innocent schoolchildren.  One week 
after the bombing, tens of thousands of Americans participated in memorial services and 
marches.  Northern whites wrote to the NAACP to join, to condemn, and to apologize.  A white 
lawyer from Los Angeles wrote that “[t]oday I am joining the NAACP; partly, I think, as a kind 
of apology for being caucasian.”
86  Another northerner condemned whites who were complicit in 
the bombing as “the worst barbarians” and she was “ashamed to think that I bear their color 
skin.”
87  The bombing, she went on, had “certainly changed my attitude,” which had been 
“somewhat lukewarm” on civil rights.  A white man from New Rochelle, New York wrote: 
“How shall I start?  Perhaps to say that I am white, sorry, ashamed, and guilty. . . . Those who 
have said that all whites who, through hatred, intolerance, or just inaction are guilty are right.”
88
The NAACP urged its members to “flood Congress with letters in support of necessary civil 
rights legislation to curb such outrages,”
89 and many of them did. 
Despite such growing outrage, Wallace remained enormously popular with his 
constituents, and he continued to rail against the “shocking” pronouncements of federal “judicial 
on the continuation page, not page 1.
85 Id. Law Review: same point about Kennedy quote.
86 Donald B. Brown to Roy Wilkins, 18 Sept. 1963, NAACP Papers, part 20, reel 3, 
frame 941.
87 Elouise May to NAACP, 16 Sept. 1963, NAACP Papers, part 20, reel 3, frame 947.
88 Robert E. Feir to Roy Wilkins, 23 Sept. 1963, NAACP Papers, part 20, reel 3, frame 
959.
89 NAACP press release, 21 Sept. 1963, NAACP Papers, part 20, reel 3, frame 986.
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tyrant[s]” and to urge local authorities to resist desegregation.
90  His persistence helped ensure 
that Alabama would once again provide the setting for events that would shock moderate 
Americans into action.  Early in 1965, the SCLC brought its voter registration campaign to 
Selma, Alabama, in search of another Birmingham-style victory.
91  King and his colleagues were 
drawn to the site partly by a law enforcement officer of Bull Connor-like proclivities; Dallas 
County Sheriff Jim Clark had a temper that “could be counted on to provide vivid proof of the 
violent sentiments that formed white supremacy’s core.”
92
Clark did indeed prove unable to restrain himself, and the result was another resounding 
success.  The violence culminated in Bloody Sunday, March 7, 1965, when county and state law 
enforcement officers viciously assaulted marchers as they crossed the Edmund Pettus Bridge on 
their way to Montgomery.  Governor Wallace had promised that the march would be broken up 
by “whatever measures are necessary,”
93 and Colonel Al Lingo, Wallace’s chief law enforcement 
lieutenant, insisted that the governor himself had given the order to attack.  That evening, ABC 
television interrupted its broadcast of Judgment at Nuremberg for a lengthy and vivid report of 
peaceful demonstrators being assailed by stampeding horses, flailing clubs, and tear gas.  Two 
90 Southern School News , Jan. 1964, pp. 1, 12.
91 For this paragraph and the next, see Garrow (Protest at Selma), supra note __, at 2-3, 
32-34, 42-45, 60-61, 73-80, 135, 146-49, 159 table 4-1, 223, 230-31; Stephen L. Longenecker, 
Selma’s Peacemaker: Ralph Smeltzer and Civil Rights Mediation 23-24, 36, 112-13, 123-24, 
127, 129-30, 139-42, 162-64, 174-77 (1987); Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of 
America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr. 229-43 
(1987); Carter, supra note __, at 246-49.
92 Quoted in Thornton, supra note __, at 60.
93 Quoted in Longnecker, supra note __, at 176.  Law Review: please check to make 
sure this is quoting Wallace rather than Longnecker. 
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white volunteers from the North were among killed in the events surrounding Selma. 
The nation was repulsed by the ghastly televised scenes.  Time  reported that “[r]arely in 
history has public opinion reacted so spontaneously and with such fury.”
94 President Johnson 
“deplored the brutality.”
95  Huge sympathy demonstrations took place across the country.  
Americans demanded remedial action from their congressmen, scores of whom condemned the 
“deplorable” violence and the “shameful display” in Selma and now endorsed voting rights 
legislation.
96  On March 15, 1965, President Johnson proposed such legislation in a televised 
speech before a joint session of Congress.  Seventy million Americans watched as the president 
beseeched them to “overcome this crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice” and declared his 
faith that “we shall overcome.”
97
* * * * *
94 Time, 19 March 1965, pp. 23-28.  Law Review: My notes don’t make clear which 
precise page the quotation is on.
95 Law Review: I think the Johnson quote is either in the Time Magazine article 
cited in the previous note or in Time, 26 March 1965, pp. 19-23. I’d appreciate it if you 
would check for this.
96 Congressional Record, 4984-89, 5014-15 (15 Mar. 1965).  Law Review: The 
quotations should be on these pages, though you might want to change the cites to the 
precise pages of the quotes.  Also I believe the bluebook has something to say about how to 
cite this; I wasn’t as attentive to the correct form as I might have been.  For example, we 
probably should note in parentheticals which congressmen were responsible for these 
statements. 
97 Lyndon Johnson, “Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise (15 March 
1965), in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, vol. 1, 
pp. 281, 284 (Washington, D.C. 1966). 
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Before the violent outbreaks of the 1960s, most white northerners had agreed with Brown
in the abstract, but they were disinclined to push for its enforcement.  Indeed, many agreed with 
President Eisenhower that the NAACP should rein in its demands for immediate desegregation.
98
But televised scenes of officially sanctioned brutality against peaceful black demonstrators by 
white law enforcement officers in the South horrified the vast majority of Americans; it brought 
an end to the apathy and led directly to the passage of landmark civil rights legislation.  Bro wn
was less directly responsible than is commonly supposed for putting those demonstrators on the 
street, but it was more directly responsible for their violent reception.  Brown fanned the flames 
of southern fanaticism and propelled extremist, vitriolic politicians into positions of power.  
Those politicians in turn ensured a situation ripe for the violence that northerners found 
unconscionable.  By helping lay bare the violence at the core of white supremacy, Brown
accelerated its demise. 
98 See Klarman, supra note __, at 365-66.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press26
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art5